Abstract: This article investigates the phenomenon of litigation undertaken by Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), often referred to as 'patent trolls', within the legal system of the Patents Court (PHC) of England and Wales during the period 2000-2008. Our analysis shows that patent suits involving PAEs at the PHC are rare -they account for less than 6% of all patent cases. We suggest two reasons why the PHC does not provide a welcome venue for PAE litigation. Firstly, the majority of patent cases which reach a judgment in the UK result in a ruling invalidating the patent. Secondly, the costs regime in the legal system of England and Wales requires that the losing party pay the costs of the other side. In other words, even if its own costs are kept low, a PAE which loses a case may have to spend a substantial amount of money in order to cover the costs of the other side. When taken together, it is likely that these two aspects discourage litigation by PAEs at the PHC, which accounts for the low volume of cases when compared with other jurisdictions such as the US. We also offer interesting insights to the wider debate concerning whether it is likely that in the near future there will be a similar increase in PAE litigation in Europe as has already occurred in the US over the last decade. This article also discusses potential implications for the design of the proposed European Unified Patent Court.
INTRODUCTION
Patents are designed to encourage innovation by granting temporary, exclusive intellectual property rights (IPR) with respect to an invention, thereby enabling transactions concerning these inventions via licensing and assignment agreements. There is no doubt that the enforceability of patents in court is of crucial importance within this system. Without the possibility of taking an infringement action, the patent holder would have little leverage to prevent the copying of a patented technology, or to negotiate with parties who seek to use the patented technology. In this view, litigation undertaken by so-called patent-assertion entities (PAEs), sometimes also referred to as 'nonproducing entities' or 'patent trolls', 1 could be seen as achieving precisely this goalenforcing the right to financial compensation for the use of a patented invention by third parties accords with the 3 unflattering description 'patent trolls' -entities 'lurking under the bridge' whose only function is to extract licence fees from other companies, often via the threat of legal action or the actual taking of litigation.
Due to the fact that there is no one accepted definition of PAE or 'patent troll', it is sometimes suggested that a wider understanding of the concept should be adopted, focusing on 'trolling behaviour', rather than on a particular type of 'troll' company. 9 In this view, the tactic of 'trolling' litigation could be undertaken by a number of different types of companies, including companies that do conduct their own R&D, and even companies which manufacture products. There is merit to this view -as discussed further below, there is evidence that PAEstyle litigation is now widespread within certain industries, especially among the large technology manufacturers and producers including Nokia, Research in Motion, Apple, Microsoft, and Google. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of litigation undertaken by the 'classic' type of PAE is worth investigating. We describe our methodology for identifying the PAEs in our dataset in Section 3 of this article.
Furthermore, it is notable that the problem of the 'patent troll' arises during a period when many are questioning whether the practice of patenting actually lives up to the promise of increasing levels of innovation, especially within the information and communication technology (ICT) industries. 10 For instance, a recent study notes that approximately one third of all European patents are not utilised for an industrial or directly commercial purpose, and furthermore it states that one sixth are used in order to 'block' competitors from engaging in research surrounding the protected patent. 11 Within this current debate, concerning the nature and value of the patent system, it is arguable that litigation by PAEs is of particular significance. While it is true in some respects that PAEs 'enable transactions', which is one of the aims of patenting, it is also true that the actions of PAEs may effectively stifle, and can even halt, innovation. 12 Indeed, it is often remarked that PAE litigation threatens rates of innovation and economic growth. For instance, it has been claimed that PAEs represent a "socially wasteful" business activity, diverting resources from more useful areas to the fora of litigation. 13 If true, PAE litigation, in addition to creating an economic and legal quagmire, would also provide a challenge to the justificatory theories underlying the patent system. 14 Within the global sphere of patent litigation, the majority of scholarship has focused on PAE litigation within the US jurisdiction, while there has been a comparative lack of similar analysis with regard to European jurisdictions, including the UK. With this in mind, this article sheds light on PAE litigation at the Patents Court (PHC) of England and Wales. 15 We provide a detailed analysis of all the cases that involved a PAE filed between 2000 and 2008 at the PHC. We discuss the characteristics of the enforcement system that are directly relevant to litigation involving PAEs in England and Wales. This includes both an examination of the issues in each case, such as questions of validity and infringement, and a discussion of the ultimate results and costs of litigation. We 15 There is no unified legal system for the UK. England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland have separate legal systems and courts.
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4 also draw on comparisons of the characteristics of the lawsuits, the litigating parties, and the litigated patents between the cases that involve PAEs and all other patent cases heard by the PHC. In addition, our data enable us to go one step further and to compare the patents involved in the PAE court cases with the overall population of patents protecting similar technologies.
In this context, it is notable that 'patent trolls' are much less visible in Europe than in the US. For this reason it has been remarked that the European patent system may contain unique factors which are capable of 'taming' the patent trolls. 16 For example, commentators note that a crucial factor concerns the fact that software and business method patents are much more difficult to obtain in Europe than the US. 17 Also of importance is the fact that even within the European Patent Convention (EPC) system, patents ultimately turn into national rights, which must be enforced before national courts, something which substantially increases the costs and complexity of litigation when compared to the US jurisdiction. In this article we offer two additional factors present within the patent enforcement system in England and Wales which appear to mitigate, or 'tame', PAE behaviour. Firstly, the majority of patent cases that reach a judgment in the UK result in a ruling invalidating the patent. In cases involving PAEs during 2000-2008, only in one minor part of one case was a PAE patent found to be valid. The likelihood of a patent being declared invalid by the PHC is therefore high. Secondly, the costs regime in the legal system of England and Wales requires that the losing party pay the costs of the other side. Given the relatively high costs of patent suits before the PHC, 18 this means that, even if its own costs are kept low, a PAE which loses a case may have to spend a substantial amount of money in order to pay the costs of the other side. When taken together, these two aspects discourage litigation by PAEs at the PHC. As a result, within the UK jurisdiction the problems associated with PAEs stifling innovation appear to be somewhat mitigated. This could help explain the low number of cases involving PAEs before the PHC -they account for less than 6% of all patent cases between 2000 and 2008. Further to this, we present data regarding the type of patents that are enforced by PAEs and the defence mechanisms employed by the alleged infringers. 19 Hence, over the course of this article we primarily seek to analyse the cases brought by PAEs before the PHC and to assess the characteristics of the patents enforced by PAEs in these cases. While this article therefore does not provide any direct answers with regard to the impact of PAEs on rates of innovation more generally, it does add a substantial amount of empirical evidence to this current debate. We also offer interesting insights to the wider debate concerning whether it is likely that in the near future there will be a similar increase in PAE litigation in Europe as has already occurred in the US over the last decade (see Section 2). This article also discusses what the characteristics of an enforcement system which aims to limit potentially socially disruptive behaviour by PAEs would be. This has not only potential implications for the design of the proposed European Unified Patent Court, but could also prove useful for the general understanding of incentives provided by enforcement systems for PAE litigation.
The following section discusses the concept of PAEs and the existing relevant literature in more detail. Section 3 provides a detailed analysis of all court cases before the Patents Court during the period 2000-2008 that involved a PAE, together with a discussion of the relevant characteristics of the patent enforcement system of England and Wales. Section 4 summarises our findings and offers some concluding thoughts. 
PATENT-ASSERTION ENTITIES (PAEs)
The PAE business model is highly controversial. As noted above, the model envisages the PAE enforcing its acquired patents against producing companies. Therefore, for a PAE, a law suit primarily provides the opportunity for the negotiation and collection of settlement payments. Filing a law suit against a potential infringer may provide a PAE with leverage over a producing entity in a number of ways. For instance, due to the fact that patent litigation by PAEs is undoubtedly a worldwide phenomenon, it is possible for a PAE to file a law suit against a producing company simultaneously in multiple jurisdictions. 20 Via this multifaceted set of legal actions a PAE may be able to obtain an injunction preventing, or 'holding up', the sale of a product. 21 Even if an injunction is not granted, or is only granted in a single jurisdiction/market, the mere possibility of this occurring may encourage the producing company to enter into a licence agreement with the PAE, which could in turn provide the PAE with a lucrative source of licensing revenue. 22 In addition, alleged infringers may also prefer to make a quick settlement with the PAE instead of engaging in a lengthy and potentially costly lawsuit aimed at invalidating the PAE's patent, a scenario which may enable a PAE to effectively enforce a weak patent which would otherwise be found invalid by a court. 23 Furthermore, settlements are commonplace in cases involving PAEs -it is very rare for defendants to be found by the court to have actually copied a patented technology. 24 Although it cannot be said that settlements between PAEs and producing companies always favour the PAE, as stated above there are notable examples of settlements which have involved a large producing company paying a substantial licence fee to a PAE.
In light of this, there is growing widespread concern among policy makers that patent litigation by PAEs is becoming a disruptive force with respect to product market competition and innovation. 25 There is ample anecdotal evidence to suggest that PAE litigation may have a disruptive effect on high-tech companies, especially in the telecommunication and software industries. 26 In the information and communication technology (ICT) sector profitability largely depends on products reaching the market place before a competitor's similar product, therefore the problem of bringing to market a (new) product which is threatened by a 'hold-up' is particularly evident. 27 In addition, patents on ICT technologies are often characterised by low substitutability, which can attribute a disproportionate level of importance to an individual patent despite its relatively minor contribution to 13/2012 6 a product. In addition, patents on ICT-related technologies often cover software and business methods patentspatents which have been shown to often have fuzzy boundaries. 28 In particular, the existence of numerous 'fuzzy' software and business method patents enables the creation of 'patent thickets' i.e. fields of broad, overlapping patent claims. 29 Furthermore, the existence of standards and standard-essential patents, often necessitated by the need for interoperability, is also common in the ICT sector. This enhances the potential importance of individual patents, owned by PAEs, which cover 'essential standards'. The available empirical evidence supports the conclusion that patents on ICT-related technologies are most frequently asserted by PAEs, whereas PAEs very rarely litigate patents in the areas of chemicals and pharmaceuticals. 30 Defenders of PAEs argue that the PAE business model enables the monetisation of patents, and by extension the monetisation of inventions, in the so-called "market for technology." 31 In this view, it is argued that the behaviour of PAEs is fully in line with the spirit of patent law because PAEs do enable transactions. 32 Furthermore, an inventor may choose to assign, or sell, his or her patents to a PAE in order to maximise his own revenue stream because a PAE is likely to be in a better position to negotiate a higher licence fee than the individual inventor. This is especially plausible with regard to small-scale individual inventors who may lack the resources to enforce their patents against large manufacturing companies. It could also be argued that new ventures might benefit from the option of selling patents to PAEs as this may increase their salvage value in case of bankruptcy. However, recent scholarship pours scorn on the supposed 'positive' effects of PAE activities. Bessen et al. suggest that while PAEs have the effect of enabling a market for patents, this may not enable a market for technology. In fact, the behaviour of PAEs tends to inhibit a true market for technology by discouraging R&D in areas where there is a high probability of PAE litigation occurring. In addition, Bessen et al. demonstrate that very little of the revenue raised by PAEs via litigation finds its way back to inventors. 33 Bessen et al. remark that "there are a lot of big losers" from PAE litigation, "while hardly anyone benefits much". 34 As discussed above, the notion of 'PAE' is not static. In fact, two new forms of PAE-types have come into view of late. In addition to PAE ownership, ICT patents are also often owned by product market competitors, such as Nokia, Research In Motion, Apple, Microsoft, Google, and Samsung. This increases the potential for litigation to occur. One new type of PAE is armed with patents assigned to it by large producing companies. From the point of view of the producing companies, the underlying purpose of this activity appears to be to make use of the PAE to attack the producing companies' direct competitors, which illustrates that PAEs may have already become a tool for moving competition from the product market into the court room. 35 Often considerable uncertainty surrounds the assignment of patents to these PAEs, which makes it difficult to gauge the motives of litigation, and hence for competing companies to obtain reasonable settlement agreements.
7
Nevertheless, it is plausible that this tactic could be used to weaken a competing firm, or it could even enable a large company to push a smaller firm out of the market entirely. The other new PAE-type which has emerged is the so-called 'patent mass aggregator'. These mass aggregators share many characteristics with PAEs, but they appear to raise the stakes of the game. Feldman and Ewing for example estimate that Intellectual Ventures (IV), probably the most well-known and notorious patent aggregator, owns around 30,000 to 60,000 patents worldwide and has spread the ownership of its portfolio across a cobweb of at least 1,200 shell companies. 36 To finance its activities, Feldman and Ewing report that IV has raised at least US$5 billion in funding. Further to this, a lot of uncertainty surrounds the business of patent mass aggregators. It appears that their goal is to not only acquire patents for their own litigation purposes, but also to engage in agreements to generate licensing revenue for other patent-owning companies by enforcing their patents on their behalf, for instance by acting as exclusive licensees of the other companies' patents. Mass aggregators can also provide patents to other companies so that these companies can use the patents as defence weapons in case they are ever sued for patent infringement. In a similar vein, mass aggregators may also choose to license patents to small PAEs, which then enforce them against third parties. The existence of new types of PAE illustrates the fact that the 'PAE environment' is in a constant state of flux, with new business models emerging frequently. However, these business models are often of dubious transparency and may operate for motives which are difficult to anticipate. For these reasons it is difficult to draw general conclusions when analysing 'trolling behaviour' or when searching for the 'average PAE', something which is acknowledged below in the context of our methodology for identifying the PAEs in our dataset.
While identifying PAEs can be a complex process, it is nonetheless clear that over the past decade the amount of court cases involving PAEs has exploded in the US. According to data from RPX, the number of cases increased from 499 in 2006 to 1,312 cases in 2011. 37 Moreover, not only has the absolute number increased dramatically, court cases involving PAEs also account for a considerably larger share in the total number of patent court cases in the US. Chien suggests that the share almost doubled from 20% in 2000 to 36% in 2008. 38 The dramatic increase in the number of court cases implies that also the number of companies that are sued by PAEs in US courts has surged from around 580 in 2001 to over 5,000 in 2011. 39 While the empirical literature on litigation involving PAEs is growing, especially in the context of the US jurisdiction, there is little evidence on the overall economic impact of PAE litigation. One exception is the work of Tucker, who looks directly at the effect of assertion of patents by PAEs on sales and innovation by allegedly infringing companies. In particular, Tucker assesses the impact of a lawsuit filed by PAE Acacia in 2007 against 13 producers of healthcare information technology. 40 The case is in many ways representative of a typical troll lawsuit: Acacia acquired two patents from two independent inventors, who had not asserted the patent themselves, for the purpose of enforcing it afterwards in the court of Eastern District of Texas, an infamous location for PAE patent lawsuits. Tucker finds that the defendants suffered a considerable drop in sales during the trial. Furthermore, this drop cannot be explained by an equivalent drop in demand for the concerned software. Instead the evidence suggests the drop is due to a halt in innovation as the number of new software releases plummeted to zero during the lawsuit. Tucker's research shows that PAE litigation can negatively affect producing entities regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit -the Acacia case for example eventually settled. It also helps explain the findings by Bessen et al. who find that alleged infringers experience a fall in their stock 
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8 market price as a direct consequence of litigation taken against them by PAEs. Overall this fall in stock market value exceeds the revenues recovered by the litigating PAEs, implying a net social loss. 41 It is notable that even though PAEs litigate on a global basis, the majority of the available empirical evidence on litigation involving PAEs and their associated impact on innovation, including the results discussed above, is based on litigation before US courts. 42 Indeed, while there has been some anecdotal evidence on the activity of PAEs outside of the US, empirical evidence has largely been missing. 43 It is thus unclear whether patent trolls are largely confined to the US legal system or whether they pose similar challenges in other jurisdictions, notably the major European markets. It is necessary to consider the potential for similar surges in troll litigation to occur in European jurisdictions, and the UK in particular. However, the lack of available empirical evidence on PAE litigation in Europe, combined with concern over the potential negative impact of trolls upon innovation rates of European companies, has led to a great deal of uncertainty. 44 With this in mind, over the course of section 3 we provide the first thorough empirical study of PAE litigation at the PHC.
ASSESSING PAE LITIGATION BEFORE THE PHC
As stated above, within the sphere of global patent litigation, numerous commentators recognise that the European patent system appears to contain specific features that make PAE litigation less lucrative. 45 Notably, under the EPC system it is more difficult to obtain patents for software and business methods than it currently is under US law, which means that the problem of 'over-broad' patents with 'fuzzy' boundaries is less noticeable in Europe. 46 In applying the EPC, the European Patent Office (EPO) and the UK courts will only accept a patent on a computer program or a business method invention if it has an appropriate 'technical' element. 47 However, 9 the meaning of technical in this context is of uncertain definition, 48 which means that software and business method patents are less strong and generally less prevalent in Europe than in the United States. 49 Another important reason why patent trolls are less prevalent in litigation in Europe is the absence, at present, of a unitary European patent. That is, once a patent has been granted by the EPO, it has to be validated into national patents at each national patent office. This in turn means that patents have to be enforced and invalidated in each EPC member state within which the patent is individually in force. The requirements of multijurisdictional litigation has important consequences for the complexity and costs involved, while the potential reward may only be an injunction which is confined to the specific member state. 50 From the perspective of a PAE, this may make undertaking litigation in Europe less attractive relative to the US. For this reason, given the fact that a Unified Patent Court (UPC) for Europe is on the horizon, some commentators have speculated whether this will have the effect of increasing or decreasing troll litigation. 51 At this stage, given the fact that the details of the court's make-up have not yet been decided, it is not possible to give a firm assessment of the potential impact of the UPC. However, by analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the PHC, we aim to demonstrate the characteristics of a patent enforcement system that limits potentially socially litigation by PAEs.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM OF ENGLAND AND WALES
Patent litigation at the PHC is guided by the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). 52 Although infringement cases filed by patent-holders are common, and may provoke a counter-claim for revocation, it is not unusual for claimants to file suit seeking the revocation of a patent. In such a case a defendant may choose to counter-claim for infringement. In the context of the ICT sector a third type of case might involve a party seeking to challenge the 'essentiality' of a patented 'standard'. In a case where patent infringement has been proven, the possible restitution measures which may be granted by the court can include a public declaration of the defendant's infringement, an order for disclosure of information related to the allegedly infringing product, an injunction to stop the infringement, the delivery or destruction of infringing goods, the payment of damages, as well as the receipt of the relevant profits earned by the infringer. 53 It is generally the case that an injunction may be stayed pending an appeal. 54 Nonetheless, it is usually the case that the PHC will not grant a stay of its own proceedings pending foreign proceedings. In spite of this, the PHC will sometimes grant a stay with regard to EPO opposition proceedings, but only where the relevant circumstances require it. For example, as described below, in one case in our dataset involving a PAE, a stay was granted pending EPO opposition proceedings.
Moreover, it is generally acknowledged that patent litigation before the PHC can be a lengthy process -cases filed before the PHC often take a year or more to make it to full trial. 55 It is also often stated that litigation at the PHC tends come at a 'high cost' for both claimants and defendants. 56 In addition, some commentators argue that the UK courts tend to be 'anti-patent' -it is often suggested that patents tend to be invalidated more frequently before the PHC when compared to other courts in other jurisdictions. 57 With respect to infringement cases, this view of the PHC might lead potential claimants, wary of having their patents invalidated, to seek to avoid litigation in the UK. On the other hand, potential defendants may regard the UK as a propitious jurisdiction for challenging the validity of patents and/or claiming non-infringement. 58 With regard to the case outcomes and costs of patent litigation at the PHC, we validate these claims empirically in a companion paper using data on all patent cases filed at the Patents Court (PHC) from 2000 to 2008. 59 In addition to our analysis of PAE lawsuits undertaken below, we also draw on these previous data where relevant.
DATA SOURCE
For our overall study, we assembled a dataset that contains all patent court cases at the PHC during the period 2000-2008, a total of 255 cases. 60 In this article we single out all cases, a total of 15, that involve a PAE, regardless of whether the PAE is the claimant or defendant. We have detailed information on the characteristics of the court cases, the parties involved and the litigated patents, which we obtained from the court records as well as a number of external databases. The appendix provides a detailed discussion of how we constructed our dataset.
The analysis of litigation involving PAEs in the context of the UK is in many ways easier than in similar work on PAEs in the US. The main reason for this is that the number of litigants is significantly smaller, which allowed us to search manually for PAEs among all 580 litigants (claimants and defendants).
As noted above, it is extremely difficult to definitely state that a certain entity is a PAE. Nonetheless, to undertake the requisite analysis there is a need to identify a broad area of 'PAE litigation'. In order to examine the field of PAE litigation within our overall dataset, we utilised a list of 130 PAEs which was assembled based on the existing literature and databases. We also double checked any names in our list of litigating parties that we could not find in our list of PAEs but that we could not easily associate with R&D or some productive activity. By relying on the existing evidence to identify PAEs, we generally avoid having to take a definitive stance on whether a given company should be regarded as a PAE.
On the basis of the materials available to us, we decided to include eight companies contained within our dataset under the framework of 'PAE litigation' -Rambus Inc., Document Security Systems, Gemstar TV Guide International Inc., Inpro Licensing, Interdigital Technology Corporation, IPcom Gmbh, Sisvel and Visto Corporation. Rambus Inc. and Gemstar were identified as PAEs by Fischer and Henkel. 61 Goode has identified Document Security Systems as a PAE 62 while McCurdy has noted that IPcom Gmbh is a PAE. 63 Interdigital Inc. and Inpro Licensing were identified as PAEs by Shrestha. We took care to exclude potential examples of 'PAE litigation' where we thought it appropriate. Within our list, Sisvel is an interesting example as it was created out of a pool of patents on behalf of innovative companies including Philips and France Telecom. 65 As such this case represents an example of a newer type of 'PAE litigation'. Furthermore, Cook and Bevan argue convincingly that Sisvel is indeed a PAE. 66 Our data also include a case that involves Qualcomm Corporation, which some have argued may share some of the characteristics of a PAE. 67 However, Qualcomm's case does not fall into our understanding of 'PAE litigation' and thus, is excluded. One reason for this is that the specific case in our database involves two patents on mobile telephony that were invented by Qualcomm. 68 Another reason is that in our study of the literature we found little or no reference to Qualcomm being involved in PAE litigation.
Visto (known as Good Inc. since March 2009) is a software company that, in addition to patent licensing, also performs innovative research and development. 69 Therefore, it is not a non-producing entity or patent troll. Nonetheless, we include the cases involving RIM and Visto 70 in our analysis of PAE litigation. There are several reasons for considering the disputes between these companies in our analysis. First, Visto established a direct link to a known non-practicing entity, NTP, shortly before Visto commenced litigation against RIM. At the time, NTP was already engaged in a protracted lawsuit against RIM which ended in a US$ 612.5 million settlement in March 2006 in NTP's favour. 71 Not long before the settlement, in December 2005, NTP acquired an equity stake in Visto and entered a licensing agreement under which NTP licensed patents to Visto. 72 Shortly thereafter, in May 2006, Visto sued RIM in the US for infringement of four patents related to wireless data transmission. 73 The case followed earlier infringement suits against Microsoft, Seven Networks, and Good Technology. 74 In fact, at this stage Visto has a rather lengthy history of patent assertions, 75 which is another reason to characterise cases brought by Visto within the category of 'PAE litigation'. Third, Visto received capital investment of US$35 million from Altitude Capital Partner, a company which specializes in IP monetization, in early 2007 -while still engaged in the lawsuit with RIM. 76 The existence of factors such as the link with NTP, the equity investment by Altitude Capital, and its track record of patent lawsuits has led some commentators to place Visto's litigious behaviour within the field of 'PAE litigation'. 77 Therefore, although it is clear that Visto cannot be categorized as a NPE, 78 in our view there are sound arguments to include the Rim v Visto case in our set of PAE cases. This said, the case serves to illustrate the difficulty in classifying companies as PAEs -where this is not unambiguously possible, the object of analysis has to be at the case-level and the decision ultimately requires some subjective judgment.
In addition to detailed information concerning the court cases and patents involved in the 15 cases that involve PAEs, for comparative value our study also uses detailed information on all other patent cases before the PHC, as well as of comparative patents which have not been involved in litigation. The appendix describes these additional data in more detail.
PAE CASES
In this section, we provide a detailed discussion of the 15 court cases that involve PAEs filed before the PHC between 2000 and 2008. We discuss the characteristics of these cases at three levels: at the level of the court case, at the level of the individual patents involved in the cases and at the level of the litigating parties.
With respect to the court cases, Table 1 provides an overview. It lists all 15 cases, the claimants, defendants, the claim at issue, the outcome of the case, and the year in which the case was lodged. The table shows that there has been no clear-cut increase in PAE litigation over time. While it is true that there was only a single PAE case The first case, which involved two joined applications heard as one case, 79 Rambus v Micron and Rambus v Hyundai, Rambus claimed infringement and sought an injunction, damages and delivery up with respect to an invention in the area of semiconductor technology featuring Rambus' European patent. The defendants counterclaimed for revocation. The PHC case was stayed subject to the outcome of a related EPO hearing on the validity of the relevant patent. The EPO subsequently revoked the patent and in 2004 the PHC apportioned costs between the parties as described below. 80 In a long running dispute 81 between Nokia Corporation, the well-known mobile phone manufacturer, and Interdigital, a PAE, multiple patents belonging to each party were in dispute over the course of three cases. The 
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Trolls at the High Court? 13 first case, in which Nokia sought revocation of three of Interdigital's patents, was settled --only stay applications were heard by the PHC and CA. 82 Following this, during 2005 Nokia took a second case to have the PHC declare 29 of Interdigital's patents as non-essential to the third generation mobile telecommunications standard in Europe (3G UMTS). The number of patents in suit was eventually whittled down to four patents by the time of the PHC judgment, 83 which granted to Nokia declarations of non-essentiality for three out of four patents. The PHC held that only claim six of the remaining patent would be infringed. In December 2006 Interdigital filed suit in the third case which it undertook against Nokia with respect to the alleged non-essentiality of 35 of Nokia's patents regarding the 3G UMTS. The series of cases was eventually settled during 2008. 84 Unfortunately we possess no information on the terms of the settlement agreement. 85 In the 2006 case of Research in Motion v Inpro 86 (a case which T-Mobile joined as Part 20 defendants 87 ) the facts concerned a patent on a hand-held, or 'field', computer featuring a small display which could access the Internet. The PHC and the Court of Appeal held the patent invalid on the ground of obviousness. 88 In Sandisk v Koninklijke Philips, 89 another case which arose during 2006, one of the defendants was Sisvel, 90 an Italian PAE set up by the other defendants --Philips, France Telecom, IRT, and TDF --to hold a pool of patents related to MPEG audio technology, and MP3 players in particular. Sisvel claimed that four of its patents were essential to the manufacture of Sandisk's MP3 audio players. However, Sandisk refused Sisvel's offer of a licence for the use of the patents. Following this refusal, Sisvel then attempted to enforce the patents by utilising the European Border Detention Regulation to block the import of Sandisk's MP3 audio products into the EU. At the High Court Sandisk took both an action alleging breach of competition law and an action relating to Sisvel's patents. Only the patent action is relevant to our study. 91 With regard to the patent issues the PHC gave judgment on 4 initial applications -it struck out Sandisk's case seeking a declaration that the 4 patents were 'nonessential' to MP3 players, ordered Sandisk to disclose product descriptions of its MP3 players, ordered a separate trial of the defendants' application to amend one of its patents, and allowed Sandisk to amend its grounds of invalidity to plead that the invention was not patentable. However, the case did not reach a full trial hearing at the PHC because Sandisk eventually settled and took a licence from Sisvel. 92 The case of European Central Bank v Document Security Systems 93 represents another case where the validity of a PAE's patent was challenged before the PHC. Document Security Systems (DDS) is a PAE which holds patents 13/2012 14 related to banknote anti-counterfeiting technology. The DDS patent was ultimately held to be invalid by the PHC in 2007 due to the issue of added matter, a ruling which was upheld by the Court of Appeal in 2008. 94 During 2008, judgment was granted in RIM v Visto by the PHC in favour of RIM. The PHC ruled that the Visto patent was invalid. Nevertheless, Visto "won" on the issue of infringement -the PHC stated that had the patent been valid it would have been infringed. Furthermore, following a counterclaim by Visto, RIM conceded that two of its patents were invalid. 95 A later case taken by RIM to revoke three of Visto's divisional patents, with Visto counterclaiming to revoke four RIM patents, was settled. 96 The 2009 PHC case of Gemstar v Virgin 97 related to three of Gemstar's European patents, which covered various aspects of electronic programme guides (EPGs) for TV set top boxes. In 2009, the PHC found that all three patents were invalid for a variety of reasons including excluded subject matter, lack of novelty and lack of inventive step. In 2011 the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the PHC. 98 Another example in our dataset saw a PAE, IPCom, engage in a series of five cases 99 with Nokia during hearings in 2009 and 2010. 100 Nokia sought revocation of IPCom's patents 101 before the PHC. IPCom responded by alleging infringement by Nokia concerning the same patents. Four out of five of the cases settled. With regard to the case which did proceed to judgment, both the PHC and the Court of Appeal held that two of IPCom's patents were invalid -one for obviousness and one for lack of novelty and obviousness. The two parties have continued to litigate against each other, with the most recent case decided in February 2012. 102 However, these later cases fall outside our dataset because they were filed post-2008. Nonetheless, the existence of recent cases, notwithstanding earlier settlements, illustrates the complexity at the heart of PAE litigation, as well as potentially ongoing nature of, these types of cases.
Regarding general conclusions on the subject of PAEs, there were in total 15 patent cases filed during the period 2000-2008, a relatively small number. Eight PAEs were involved -Rambus, Interdigtal, Visto, Inpro, IPCom, DDS, Gemstar and Sisvel. Strikingly, in most cases the revocation of the PAE's patents was soughtonly two out of the 15 cases involved an initial infringement claim at the PHC by a PAE (the cases filed by Rambus and Gemstar). On the other hand, eleven cases were filed seeking to revoke the patent(s) held by PAEs -see Table 2 . One additional case was filed seeking to declare the PAE patents non-essential to the relevant industry standard and one more was filed by a PAE to declare a producing company's patents non-essential (both cases were part of the Nokia v Interdigital dispute).
Six PAE cases end with a full judgment by the PHC, with one further judgment acknowledging the outcome of EPO proceedings. The corresponding case outcomes are striking: only with respect to one minor issue in a single case, during the dispute between Nokia and Interdigital, was infringement found by the court, and this was in the context of a case where three other PAE patents were found to be non-essential and not infringed. Instead, in five cases the patents were revoked by the UK courts. In addition, the patent in dispute in the Rambus v Micron and Rambus v Hyundai case that was stayed at the PHC was revoked by the EPO. When the UK and EPO rulings are taken together, there is an overall revocation rate of 85% for cases that ended with a judgment. 103 This figure is substantially larger than the numbers found for court cases in the US involving PAEs. for example finds an invalidation rate of 28% of PAE cases that ended with a judgement on merits while Shresta (2011) only finds 16% of PAE patent cases to end with the invalidation of a PAE patent.
Nevertheless, in eight cases out of 15 cases the outcome was a settlement, which most likely involved a payment to the PAE in each case (as in the settlement involving Sandisk and Sisvel). 104 However, of these eight cases which were settled, four were effectively part of the same long-running dispute between Nokia and IPCom and another two were part of the dispute between Nokia and Interdigital. Therefore, if cumulative 'disputes' between parties rather than individual cases are examined, we find that four out of eight disputes between PAE cases and other companies ended with a settlement.
Interestingly, with respect to the five Nokia v IPCom cases and the three Nokia v Interdigital cases in our dataset, in each saga the PHC issued one ruling. In Nokia v IPCom, two IPcom patents were revoked by the PHC, while In Nokia v Interdigital, three out of four Interdigital patents were declared non-essential and non-infringed. With respect to both of these sagas, it is possible that these rulings, which largely went against the PAEs, were influential on the eventual settlement agreements and would suggest settlements in favour of Nokia rather than the PAEs. Table 2 compares the claims in the PAE cases summarised above with the population of patent cases filed at the PHC during 2000-2008. In the population of cases, the most frequent claim is for the infringement of a patent (45%), whereas in PAE cases, as discussed above, by far the most frequent claim is for the revocation of a patent (73%). This suggests that companies may proactively attempt to invalidate patents owned by PAEs in the UK. Similarly, it is possible that a company, having already been targeted by a PAE in another jurisdiction, may make the strategic decision to use litigation before the PHC of England and Wales in order to invalidate in the UK the equivalent of the PAE patents asserted against the company in the other jurisdiction.
Regarding the case outcomes, Table 3 shows that for the 240 non-PAE cases during 2000-2008, by far the most likely outcome is the revocation of a patent regardless of the claim of the action (revocation occurs in 25% of infringement cases and 43% of revocation cases). The total absolute numbers are considerably lower for PAE cases; hence a 50% revocation rate for infringement claims should be interpreted with caution. Indeed, it is interesting to note that all revocation cases ended either with the invalidation of a patent or a settlement -four out of 11 revocation cases (36%) ended with the invalidation of a patent by the PHC and the remainder settled. This means that revocation is the most likely outcome of a judgment at the PHC regardless of whether the case involves a PAE or not. Further to this, it is striking that the settlement rate for revocation claims is considerably larger in cases that involve PAEs than in the population of patent cases. In addition, regarding appeals for all non-PAE cases during 2000-2008, from our analysis 105 we know that about a third of all non-PAE cases proceeded to the Court of Appeal, where in 80% of cases the judgment of the PHC was upheld. Regarding appeals in PAE cases, 100% of the initial decisions of the PHC were upheld by the CA, though this statistic also reflects the fact that only a small number of PAE cases were appealed from the PHC to the CA. Overall the high rate of invalidation of patents at the PHC would probably discourage PAE litigation.
In light of the high likelihood of revocation of patents owned by PAEs, it is worth taking a closer look at the litigated patents and considering whether the patents concerned are of particularly low quality. Figure 1 plots the age (measured as the difference between the priority date of a patent and the beginning of the law suit) distributions of the patents in dispute in the 15 PAE cases and those in the other 240 cases heard by the PHC between 2000 and 2008. 106 The figure shows that neither patents aged ≤5 years nor >20 years are involved in PAE disputes. Most of the patents in PAE lawsuits are either between six and ten years or 16 and 20 years old, whereas in the population of court cases, most patents are between six and 15 years old. In any case, this evidence suggests that these patents have been visible to potential infringers for a substantial amount of time. By this rationale, it is logical to conclude that any uncertainty concerning the protected technologies ought to have disappeared by the time the patents are enforced. 107 As noted above, the available evidence in the existing literature suggests that patents asserted by PAEs tend to be overwhelmingly ICT related, with most patents covering inventions in the areas of telecommunication and digital communication. 108 Figures 2 and 3 confirm that the patents involved in the PAE High Court cases are overwhelmingly concentrated in the ICT sector. This is significant because, as described above, ICT patents have certain distinctive characteristics which make them attractive to trolls. The PHC data provide a particularly striking illustration of the concentration of patents involved in PAE litigation in ICT because overall the majority of the cases in the population of lawsuits heard by the PHC during 2000-2008 involve pharmaceutical patents. Hence, while pharmaceutical patents represent the largest share of patents in the population of PHC cases generally, there is not a single patent protecting chemical or pharmaceutical inventions found within our set of PAE cases. Figure 3 breaks down the technologies protected by the patents involved in the 15 PAE lawsuits. Little surprisingly, most patents protect inventions concerning the transmission of digital content.
In addition, regarding the quality of PAE patents, it is acknowledged that directly assessing 'patent quality' is difficult. 109 Instead of attempting to qualitatively assess PAE patents individually, in our study we indirectly assess quality by measuring patent value. We do this because patent quality and value are positively correlated, 110 therefore by comparing the value of the patents involved in the PAE suits with other litigated and non-litigated patents, we can gain some insights as to the overall quality of the patents. Table 3 compares the PAE patents with set of control patents. We measure patent value by a range of metrics established in the literature, including forward citations, references to prior art in form of patents (backward citations) and the non-patent literature, the size of the patent family, the number of inventors, and the number of different IPC subclasses as a rough measure of patent breadth. The comparison with the overall population of litigated patents suggests that the patents involved in PAE lawsuits do not differ in a statistically significant way for all value metrics, except for 106 The set of patents involved in PAE cases excludes the 35 patents owned by Nokia whose standard essentiality was contested by Interdigital. 107 However, Appendix Table 1 serves as a note of caution with regard to the `visibility' of the patents as more than half of all patents do not show the PAE as the legal owner in EPO's Espacenet online database (http://worldwide.espacenet.com). M. Reitzig, J. Henkel, and F. Schneider, 'Collateral Damage for R&D manufacturers: How Patent Sharks Operate in Markets for Technology,' Industrial and Corporate Change 19 (2010), 947-967. 109 Definitions in the legal literature regard patent quality as the degree to which a granted patent satisfies the legal patentability requirements at a given patent office and is likely to withstand invalidity proceedings in court or before an administrative body -see R. P. This suggests that the quality of a given patent could be measured by the outcome of an infringement/invalidation suit. However, this approach is of limited in use in this context because we are interested in assessing whether a given patent that has been invalidated was indeed of low quality. 110 Patent value is determined by a larger set of factors than patent quality -see discussion in footnote 95 above.
backward citations and the number of IPC subclasses. Patents involved in PAE cases tend to have fewer backward citations, which may indicate that they are less derivative of existing technologies. In contrast, they tend to cover a larger number of IPC subclasses, which may be an indication that they tend to be broader. Nevertheless, this seems to suggest that these patents are not of obviously less value, and therefore of less quality, than the average litigated patent before the PHC. However, we know that most patents that are litigated before the PHC protect pharmaceutical inventions, which may imply that this is the wrong comparison. In order to strengthen our comparison, we draw a control sample of patents which protect similar ICT technologies that have not been involved in litigation. 111 The results are striking: the lower panel in Table 4 suggests that these litigated patents are of higher value than those not litigated according to all value metrics (except for the number of inventors).
Therefore, two primary conclusions emerge from our comparisons at the patent-level. Firstly, according to our value metrics, patents asserted by PAEs are not significantly different from the average patent involved in lawsuits before the PHC between 2000 and 2008. This is interesting especially because we know that the patents involved in PAE disputes protect mostly inventions on digital data transmission whereas most of the other litigated patents are on pharmaceutical compounds and processes. Secondly, these patents are nevertheless more valuable than non-litigated patents that protect similar ICT inventions. This indicates that PAEs judiciously select the patents that they enforce within the set of ICT patents potentially available to them. 112 Still, if it is true that the patents involved in PAE litigation are more valuable, and therefore of greater quality, than comparable nonlitigated patents, the fact that there is nonetheless still a high likelihood of their revocation by the PHC is surprising.
Finally, we have a closer look at the firms involved in litigation with PAEs and compare them to other firms that were involved in patent litigation albeit not involving a PAE. Table 5 compares the distribution of companies involved in PAE cases with the population of companies involved in lawsuits before the PHC between 2000 and 2008. 113 The table shows that two thirds of the 12 companies (see Appendix Table A2 ) 114 that engaged in a lawsuit with a PAE are in the high-tech industry. Two companies are in the telecommunication sector, which are telecom companies T-Mobile and Nokia Siemens Networks. Another two companies are classified in the "Other Services" and "Business Services" categories, which are the Virgin Media companies. The distribution reflects the striking difference with the population of court cases already pointed out at the patent level: there are no pharmaceutical or chemical companies involved in litigation with PAEs whereas in the population of court cases, pharmaceutical and chemical companies account for around a third of litigating parties. In contrast, there are relatively fewer telecommunication and high-tech companies in the population of litigants.
ASSESSING THE COSTS OF PATENT LITIGATION FOR PAES
It is generally acknowledged that the costs of taking a patent case at the PHC are substantial. 115 Regarding specific cost sums, from the available data on all patent cases at the PHC during the period 2000-2008 we estimate that the costs, encompassing both sides' expenses, of a full trial at the PHC can amount to between £1million and £6million. 116 Moreover, it is important to note that in England and Wales the substantive legal issues and the issues of costs and damages are dealt with separately. In addition, under CPR section 44 the unsuccessful party is required to pay the other party's costs. However, in the context of patent litigation, it is often the case that this rule is not strictly applied. 117 Nonetheless, as a general rule it is the case that the successful party will recover about twothirds of its legal fees, depending on how the issues were won and lost. 118 However, not all cases proceed, posttrial, to a full hearing on costs -cost issues are often settled between the parties. 119 For this reason, it is often the case that there are no court records available regarding the specific amount of costs and damages allotted to each side in each case. Consequently, the analysis of the costs data for PAEs undertaken here is based upon an evaluation of the records which are available.
As noted above, following two joined applications, 120 Rambus v Micron and Rambus v Hyundai, the patent actions were stayed subject to the outcome of a related EPO hearing, which subsequently revoked Rambus' patent. Following the EPO ruling, the PHC assessed the costs payable to the defendants. Micron's costs were estimated at £698,000 while Hynix's (previously known as Hyundai Electronics) costs were noted at £233,000. The PHC stated that Rambus was liable for both defendants' costs but did not make a ruling on the overall amount payable to each by Rambus. However, Rambus was ordered to pay £125,000 to each defendant as interim costs resulting from the stay. 121 Regarding the costs of cases involving PAEs, the PHC case of Gemstar v Virgin is of note. The PHC conducted a hearing on cost allocation. The PHC heard that the defendants' costs up and including the High Court judgment, after an 11 day hearing, were estimated at £2.4 million, while the claimants' costs were estimated at £1.9 million. Regarding the substantive issues of the PHC case, Virgin won most issues, crucially on the invalidity of the patents, and only lost on a small number of minor prior art issues. Consequently, the PHC projected that there should be a 13.5% costs deduction. Therefore 86.5% of Virgin's costs ought to be payable by Gemstar to Virgin (86.5% of £2.4 million is £2,076,000).
At the high end of the costs scale, the costs arising from the joined cases involving RIM and Visto are of note. The PHC trial lasted six days, though there were a number of other applications and hearings throughout the saga, including a CA hearing regarding a stay application which lasted one day. At the costs allocation hearing, the PHC stated that the costs of the case ought to be divided proportionate to the issues won at trial. In this respect, the PHC stated that Visto ought to pay RIM 66% of RIM's total assessed costs and RIM ought to pay Visto 51% of Visto's total assessed costs. However, RIM's costs were estimated at nearly £6 million while Visto's costs were estimated at £1.6 million. The PHC acknowledged that there was a great disparity between the cost levels of each side, but declined to place a cap on costs.
As stated above, a series of cases occurred which involved a PAE, IPCom, and Nokia. At a costs allocation hearing in 2010 the PHC stated that it was clear that Nokia had won on most of the substantive issues, mainly concerning the invalidity of two patents, during the 11-day trial. With regard to the series of cases, the PHC heard that Nokia's costs had reached £1.3 million by the end of January 2010, whereas IPCom's had reached approximately £300,000. 122 The PHC stated that Nokia was entitled to its costs, though the court did not apportion a specific percentage. For IPCom this would have come as a sharp blow because although its own costs (£300,000) were much smaller than Nokia's (£1.3 million), as the losing party it was liable to pay the other side's costs as well as its own. In a separate hearing on the same day, the PHC also had to discuss costs for other related cases in the series. Floyd J. stated: "The costs are very substantial, exceeding on both sides the sum of £2 million. Nokia's costs come in close to £3 million." 123 The PHC awarded Nokia a 66% share of its costs. Considering that its overall costs were around £3 million, IPCom were likely to be liable to pay Nokia around £2 million.
In contrast to the US legal system where costs are not recoverable, for PAEs, losing the substantive issues of validity in an infringement case before the PHC can have serious consequences. Even if the PAE can keep its own costs at a low level, if the PAE loses the case it will probably have to pay a large proportion of the other party's costs, which may be substantial. In the cases discussed above, we observe that the PAEs were indeed liable to the payment of substantial amounts to the winning parties. This may represent an important restraining factor with regard to the ability of PAEs to sue in the UK -especially relative to the US where costs are nonrecoverable. The available evidence for the US shows that PAEs lose a substantial share of their lawsuits, which is also much larger a fraction than that of producing companies, 124 which means that such cost-shifting could have a potentially large effect on PAEs' ability to litigate. 125 It is also interesting to note that this characteristic of the enforcement system in England and Wales seems to outweigh the potential positive effect of a high-cost system on attracting PAE litigation. PAEs may find it easier to file nuisance lawsuits in jurisdictions in which engaging in a lawsuit is extremely costly because alleged infringers may prefer a slightly less costly settlement with a certain outcome to a potentially ruinous protracted legal dispute. Hence, in principle, the enforcement system of England and Wales could attract PAEs. But our empirical evidence suggests that the combination of a high likelihood of losing a case and the liability to paying the winner's (substantial) costs of engaging in the legal action outweighs any benefits that a high-cost system may entail for PAEs.
CONCLUSION
We analyse all patent court cases involving PAEs before the PHC during 2000-2008 to show that the PHC does not provide a welcome venue for PAEs to undertake litigation. Firstly, the majority of cases involving a PAE which reach a judgment result in a ruling invalidating the patent. In cases involving PAEs during 2000-2008, only in one minor part of one case was a PAE patent found to be valid. The likelihood of a patent being declared invalid by the PHC is therefore high, especially so in comparison to the available evidence on PAE litigation in the US. In our analysis, we argue that the costs regime in the legal system of England and Wales, which requires that the losing party must pay the costs of the other side, acts as another break on PAE litigation. In the PHC enforcement system, a PAE which loses a case may have to pay a substantial amount of money to pay the costs of the other side even if its own costs are kept low. When taken together, the high likelihood of having a patent invalidated combined with the large costs which tend to accrue if a case is lost appear to discourage litigation by PAEs. In fact PAE litigation at the PHC is relatively uncommon when compared to other jurisdictions such as the US: 126 only 15 out of 255 patent cases involved a PAE, where a substantial number of these cases were between the same parties. We only find 8 PAEs to have been involved in litigation before the PHC during the nine-year period studied, and in most cases these were not infringement cases but cases where manufacturers attempted to `clear the way' by bringing patent revocation cases before the court. 127 As a result, there is good reason to assume that within the UK the problems associated with PAEs stifling innovation are somewhat mitigated (at least for the period of our study). Nevertheless, eight out of fifteen cases involving PAEs resulted in a settlement, which shows that even with respect to PHC cases PAE litigation may result in lucrative financial settlements. With regard to the characteristics of the enforcement system, our study demonstrates that the provision of a court which undertakes an in-depth analysis of patent validity, combined with a 'loser pays' costs approach, helps to discourage PAE litigation. These two elements, among others, appear to work against the possibility that a surge in PAE litigation, such as that which has already occurred in the US, will occur in Europe. This ought to be taken into account with respect to the proposed Unified Patent Court, the details of which are currently being debated by European policy makers.
Appendix -Data description
We collected data on all court cases filed between 2000 and 2008 at the PHC, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords/Supreme Court. Due to the possible long lag time between the filing of a case and a final decision, in particular if the decision rendered by the first instance is appealed, we can only include court cases that were filed before 2009 to avoid the presence of a substantial number of potentially still pending cases in our dataset. Given our interest in patent litigation, we exclude all cases that represent an appeal to an administrative decision taken by the UKIPO. We complemented the data with data from court cases heard before the PCC (Central London County Court) which we obtained from the UKIPO. Because the information on cases at the PCC had to be collected directly from the PCC, we only have detailed information on cases heard in 2007 and 2008. We collected the data on court cases at the PHC from a range of sources. Our starting point was the Patents Court Diary which lists all cases which are scheduled for a hearing or an application including, for example, a case management conference. 128 This means, in principle, the Diary contains all cases for which the claim form has been served and to which the defence has responded. The Diary provides basic information on court cases, including the case number, the names of claimants and defendants (usually only the first claimant and defendant), their legal representatives, the date the hearing was fixed, as well as the hearing dates and the duration of the hearing. In a number of cases, the Diary also notes additional information, such as whether a case was discontinued because of a settlement or stay. We use the information from the Diary to search for court records on the website of the British and Irish Legal Information Institute, 129 the case database of Lexis Nexis, 130 as well as Thomson Reuters's Westlaw database. 131 However, these sources did not offer any records for a number of cases (mostly those settled at an early stage). For these cases we searched additional sources, such as media websites, blogs or the websites of legal representatives for information.
The most basic information that we collected for all cases includes the names of all litigating parties, their country of residence (the country in which a firm is registered), the type of litigating party (e.g. company, individual, etc.), the year the claim form was served, and the type of IPR in dispute. Additional detailed information on the case was collected for all court cases that involved a patent. The information was collected and input into a standardised format. 132 The standardised template contains information on the proceedings/decision type, litigating parties, the IPR in dispute, the claims made in the case, the relief applied for, the outcome/content of the judgment, and any information on the value, costs, and potential damages associated with the case. We also include information on related cases within the England and Wales jurisdiction as well as abroad if mentioned in the available court records.
While our datasets represent the most comprehensive database gathered so far on the subject of patent litigation in the UK, at least two caveats are in order. 133 Firstly, obviously the court data provides us only with data on cases that have made it to court. Relying on the court diary, however, means that we only observe cases that not only have been filed to the court, but were allowed to proceed at least to the case management stage. There is no information available on the number of cases that are dropped between the serving of the claim form and the case appearing on the diary. However, informal conversations we conducted with practitioners lead us to believe that this figure is negligible. Secondly, since we had to assemble the information with regard to each court case, often relying on different sources, in many cases the available court records are incomplete. For example, while we may have the judgment of the PHC, we may not have records for all preceding applications. There is nevertheless a core set of variables which we were able to obtain for all cases. However, the investigation of 13/2012 22 certain specific aspects of patent litigation, such as the issue of costs, focuses on the subset of court cases for which more detailed information is available.
As part of our analysis we combine the information obtained from court records with detailed information on the parties as well as the specific patents involved in the law suits. The names of the litigating parties were matched to Compustat, Bureau van Dijk's FAME and AMADEUS, and the ICC British Company Directory databases in order to obtain information on firms' characteristics and financials. Detailed information on the litigated patents was obtained from EPO's Espacenet and PATSTAT (version October 2011). We also draw on PATSTAT to construct a control sample of patents that have not been litigated. The control sample consists of non-litigated patents that share the same priority year, priority filing authority, and IPC subclasses with the litigated patents in the 15 PAE court cases. This control sample allows us to compare the characteristics of litigated patents with those of patents that were not subject of litigation at the invention level (the priority filing). E l e c t r i c a l e n g i n e e r i n g I n s t r u m e n t s C h e m i s t r y M e c h a n i c a l e n g i n e e r i n g O t h e r E l e c t r i c a l e n g i n e e r i n g I n s t r u m e n t s C h e m i s t r y M e c h a n i c a l e n g i n e e r i n g 
